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INTRODUCTION
For those who believe that legal rules are supposed to predictably map events onto outcomes, federal postconviction law is
a frustrating mess. Most of those who try to make sense of it end
up with some variant of a pretty cynical model: if the claimant is
an inmate convicted in state court, then federal relief is unavailable. Some of us, however, remain cautiously receptive to
theories that high-court habeas outcomes express a more complex function., In Habeas and the Roberts Court, Professor Aziz
Huq establishes himself as the field's foremost academic optimist.2
In Huq's view, what might seem to be madness on the Roberts Court conceals method. The demand for federal habeas resources outstrips supply, and Huq believes that the Roberts
Court has responded by developing two "tracks" of federal postconviction inquiry: (1) a resource-light Track One marked by
numerous procedural barriers and an impossible-to-satisfy
standard of review; and (2) a resource-intensive Track Two, in
which convicted state inmates obtain relatively unimpaired federal habeas review of their constitutional claims. According to
Huq, the skeleton key to this jurisprudence is something that I
will call the "fault delta." The fault delta is the difference in
blameworthiness between the inmate and the state. Briefly
stated, Huq's descriptive thesis is that the fault delta determines the track along which a habeas petition travels and how it
is treated as it moves along the selected path.3 His normative
thesis, to which I give very short shrift in the interest of available
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I As a formal matter, a habeas proceeding is a challenge, heard in court, to the
lawfulness of custody. The form of custody at issue in a habeas proceeding need not be a
state conviction, or even a criminal conviction at all. Unless I indicate otherwise, however, I intend the terms "habeas" and "postconviction" to operate interchangeably.
2 See generally Aziz Z. Huq, Habeas and the Roberts Court, 81 U Chi L Rev 519
(2014).
3 See id at 528.
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space, is that the two-track model is more workable and desirable (relatively speaking) than some of the legislative innovations that recent scholarship has promoted.4
In Part I of this Essay, I focus on the defects in Huq's explanatory account. First, I cannot discern two tracks of federal
postconviction process, if a track is defined as a distinct path
along which an inmate avoids having to satisfy all potential restrictions on relief. Using two tracks as a descriptive framework,
then, does more to confuse than to illuminate the role of fault in
the federal postconviction process. Second, even if one accepts
that a series of procedural inquiries constitutes a second track,
Huq overstates the role of fault in determining how each track
operates. Although the concept of state fault explains much
about whether a claim subject to a state merits disposition
clears 28 USC § 2254(d) (the state-federal relitigation bar), it
explains much less about the operation of other restrictions on
the habeas remedy.
In Part II, I sound my own optimistic note. (Sort of.) I agree
that the habeas jurisprudence of the Roberts Court has certain
animating principles; I just think that they differ from those
identified by Huq. Instead of a decision tree branched by reference to fault, the Roberts Court has constructed what I call an
"on-the-merits" paradigm of federal habeas process: a sequential
set of inquiries designed to ensure that a diligent state inmate
receives at least one merits disposition on a constitutional claim.
Under the on-the-merits paradigm, whether the merits disposition comes in state or federal court does not matter. The on-themerits paradigm represents a thin procedural commitment. On
the one hand, the Roberts Court is increasingly committed to the
ideal that diligent prisoners should not lose claims without some
merits disposition. On the other hand, it appears to have deserted the principle that a state merits disposition should be the
product of reliable process.
I. THE ROLE OF FAULT IN A SINGLE TRACK
According to Professor Huq, the Supreme Court has constructed two tracks of federal habeas law, with the scrutiny afforded in each track determined by reference to the fault delta.5
Huq has, by my lights, somewhat overstated fault's role as an
4
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organizing principle. First, habeas process is not bifurcated into
multiple tracks. The multitrack model erroneously assumes that
a track terminates with a different inquiry, each corresponding
to a different standard for scrutinizing the merits of a federal
claim. In reality, there are not two such "standards of review." (I
will explain the scare quotes in a moment.)
Second, although the concept of fault does significant explanatory work, it does so only in cases in which a state decision
is "on the merits." Specifically, if a state court is "at fault" whenever it badly fumbles merits processing of the legal and factual
data before it, then fault is the lodestar for one of the most important remedial restrictions that federal courts adjudicate. But
not all state decisions are merits dispositions; when there is federal habeas litigation over state nonmerits dispositions, the role
of fault is diminished.
A. A Single Track
My first major objection to Huq's theory that there is a twotrack habeas regime organized around fault is that the Roberts
Court has not in fact constructed two tracks. If a path is a line
connecting discrete points, and if each point is a condition for
federal habeas relief, then separate tracks would require either
multiple end points or multiple routes from the first point to the
last one. A map of Roberts Court decision logic, however, discloses only a single path. For that reason, a two-track model actually obscures the active role of fault in modern habeas law.
1. Defining multiple tracks.
Huq would identify each of the two federal habeas tracks
with a different "standard of review," applicable at two different
terminal points on a logic map. (If the term "logic map" does not
make intuitive sense, its meaning should be evident in Figures 1
through 3 below.) For Huq, Track One defines habeas process for
"most petitions that are either adjudicated on the merits in state
court or, instead, subject to adequate and independent state
bars or, alternatively, federal procedural constraints."6 Track
Two, by contrast, defines habeas process for inmates satisfying
cause-and-prejudice inquiries necessary to excuse an otherwisedisqualifying procedural defect in the claim.7 A federal court
6
7
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concludes the Track One process by applying a deferential
"standard of review" to the order denying relief on the constitutional claim, and it concludes the Track Two process with de
novo "review."8

Perhaps the easiest way to convey the operation of the Roberts Court's habeas rules is through a visual representation.
Figure 1 is a logic map that depicts a simplified, single track of
federal habeas process. I believe that the logic map in Figure 1
captures the doctrine more accurately than the logic maps depicted in Figures 2 and 3.
FIGURE 1. SINGLE-TRACK FEDERAL HABEAS PROCESS
§ 2254
Petition

Successive
Petition

Procedural
Default

Limitations
Statute

Relitigation
Bar

Merits

Filed

(§ 2244(b))

Rule

(§ 2244(d))

(§ 2254(d))

Review

If there is more than one track, however, then there should
be multiple paths from the starting point to one or more end
points. First, there may be multiple tracks because there is more
than one end point. Figure 2 depicts a logic map with multiple
terminal points, and this multitrack model is the one that I consider most carefully here.
FIGURE 2. MULTITRACK FEDERAL HABEAS PROCESS-MULTIPLE
END POINTS
§ 2254
Petition
Filed

Successive
Petition
(§ 2244(b))

Procedural
Default
Rule

Limitations
Statute
(§ 2244(d))

§ 2254(d)
"Standard
of Review"

8 See id at 535-36 (assigning "highly deferential standards of review" for Track
One processing); id at 549 (assigning "plenary review" for Track Two processing).
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Second, there may be multiple tracks because there is more
than one path to the same end point. Figure 3 depicts a multitrack map with a single terminus.
FIGURE 3. MULTITRACK FEDERAL HABEAS PROCESS-SINGLE
END POINT
§ 2254
Petition
Filed

Successive Procedural
Petition
Default
(§ 2244(b))
Rule

Limitations
Statute

(§ 2244(d))

Switch

Relitigation
Bar
(§ 2254(d))

Merits
Review

[Inquiry]

Huq favors syntax over pictures but seems to argue that the
Roberts Court is developing decision logic along the lines of that
depicted in Figure 2-that is, a multitrack jurisprudence with
different terminal inquiries. Specifically, Huq's multiple references to different "standards of review" at the terminal points of
each track lead me to believe that he is not theorizing a multitrack, single-end-point logic map like that in Figure 3.9 Without
getting bogged down in detail, even if Figure 3 did capture Huq's
theory, it would be vulnerable to the same criticisms that I level
at the multiple-end-points model. 10
2. Section 2254(d) and preclusion.
Federal habeas process does not have two different tracks
resulting in two different terminal inquires, because there is in
fact only one terminal inquiry. Phrased visually, the Roberts
Court's doctrine is captured most accurately by Figure 1, not
Figure 2. What Huq describes as the "standard of review" under
§ 2254(d) is actually a relitigation restriction that any successful

9 See, for example, id at 535.
10 Even if Huq believes § 2254(d) to be a relitigation bar rather than a standard of
review, then an inmate avoiding it would still need to satisfy every other restriction in
the jurisprudence.
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inmate must avoid, and any inmate avoiding it must still satisfy
the single terminal inquiry: the inmate must prove the merits of
the constitutional claim.
Section 2254(d) restricts federal habeas relief for claims
lodged by state inmates." Courts, lawyers, and academics almost always refer to § 2254(d) as a (substantive) "standard of
review," 12 but § 2254(d) behaves much more like a (procedural)
preclusion rule. (The scare quotes should make sense now.) If
§ 2254(d) were a standard of review, a state inmate would get
relief by satisfying it; but that is not how the process works. If
§ 2254(d) indeed behaves more like a preclusion rule, then there
are not two terminal points on the logic map. There is a relitigation bar that all successful inmates must avoid, and the terminal inquiry for all inmates is the straightforward merits question. Fault may matter a great deal, but the Roberts Court has
not organized two tracks of habeas review around it.
The full argument for treating § 2254(d) as a procedural relitigation restriction is too long for this space, but its basic contours are accessible enough. Section 2254 is the major section of
the US Code dealing with federal habeas process for state inmates. Subsection 2254(a) is the basic grant of federal habeas
power to relieve unlawful state custody. Other § 2254 subsections restrict the availability of the federal remedy. For example,
§ 2254(b) disables the federal habeas remedy in the event that
an inmate has not exhausted state process. Section 2254(d) is
the relitigation restriction on the habeas remedy-that is, a
statutory preclusion rule based on the state decision. It is not a
standard for reviewing the merits of the underlying claim. As I
explain in Part 1.4, the Roberts Court is increasingly prone to
this construction of the statute.
3. The two-track theory and the relitigation bar.
If § 2254(d) is treated as a (procedural) relitigation restriction rather than a (substantive) standard of review, then the
second track vanishes. The starting point is filing and the end
point is merits review, and the inmate must satisfy every procedural restriction in between. Because an inmate never bypasses

11 28 USC § 2254(d).
12 See, for example, Allan Ides, Habeas Standards of Review under 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254(d)(1): A Commentary on Statutory Text and Supreme Court Precedent, 60 Wash &

Lee L Rev 677, 697 (2003).
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a restriction by satisfying another one, there is simply one track,
with a lot of stops. If a claim is excused from procedural default,
then the claimant still has to avoid the limitations bar, the
successive-petition restriction, and § 2254(d); if a claim is not
time-barred, then the claimant must still avoid procedural default, the successive-petition restriction, § 2254(d), and so forth.
Of course, even if outcomes do not form a separate track,
they can be highly correlated. For example, inmates excusing
the procedural default of a claim usually do avoid the § 2254(d)
relitigation bar, but not because of the fault delta. Instead, the
outcomes correlate (and inmates obtain federal merits review)
because § 2254(d) restricts relief only for claims that a state
court decides "on the merits."13 A claim is procedurally defaulted
only when the state ground for rejecting the claim was "adequate and independent."14 The independence requirement, in
turn, almost always ensures that the state ground underlying a
default is a nonmerits disposition. Inmates who can excuse the
default can obtain merits review, but the showing necessary to
secure the excuse has nothing to do with how the claim is processed under § 2254(d). Inmates with procedurally defaulted
claims can avoid § 2254(d) because the ground for denying state
relief was, by definition, not on the merits. Otherwise, the claim
would not be procedurally defaulted to begin with.
If the absence of inmate fault is driving the § 2254(d) outcomes-more so than the presence of a nonmerits adjudicationthen one would expect inmates found to be diligent pursuant to
other procedural inquiries to obtain favorable § 2254(d) outcomes. The evidence is not there. This short Essay does not lend
itself to comprehensive treatment of a controlled test, but one
example should suffice. The statute of limitations in § 2254(d) is
equitably tolled by a showing of extraordinary circumstances
(cause, roughly) and inmate diligence.15 If the fault showing
were the variable entitling an inmate to relief on the merits,
13 28 USC § 2254(d).
14 Huq, 81 U Chi L Rev at 543 n 111 (cited in note 2) ("Default rests on an adequate
and independent state ground. The independence prong ensures that a claim found to be
defaulted is never 'on the merits."').
15 See id at 544 n 104 ("The habeas statute of limitations is a creature of Congress.
28 USC § 2244(d)(1). The Court, however, has supplemented that statute with an equitabletolling exception."); Holland u Florida,560 US 631, 649 (2010) (concluding that a " [habeas]
petitioner is entitled to equitable tolling only if he shows (1) that he has been pursuing
his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way and
prevented timely filing") (quotation marks omitted).
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then one would expect a finding of equitable tolling to entail
consideration on the merits. Unfortunately, a finding of equitable
tolling-even if the "extraordinary circumstances" that trigger it
are purely state-fault conditions-does not allow an inmate to
avoid the § 2254(d) relitigation bar.
4. Evidence from the Supreme Court.
The Roberts Court has played an active role in preserving
the most important condition for a single-track model-that
§ 2254(d) behaves more like a relitigation restriction than a
standard of review. The Roberts Court's most obvious fingerprint is Cullen v Pinholster,16which brought lower-court practice
into line with the view that § 2254(d) is a relitigation restriction
and not a standard of review.17 Before Pinholster, many federal
courts-consistent with a very credible reading of § 2254(d)(1)evaluated the reasonableness of state merits dispositions by reference to evidence outside the state record.18 (In other words,
those courts analyzed the merit of the claim.) Pinholster
changed that, bringing § 2254(d) into line with common-law relitigation rules in which "the record" of the initial decision precluded collateral litigation.19 Pinholster is more broadly representative of the relitigation framework that the Roberts Court
uses to construct § 2254(d).20 Any traces of multitrack jurisprudence remain in spite of, not because of, the Roberts Court.
B. The Narrower Significance of Fault
Although Huq overstates the centrality of fault to modern
habeas jurisprudence, I agree with his assessment of several
nonfault variables. Specifically, I share Huq's skepticism about
federalism and feedback loops.21 "Federalism" is more of a decisional idiom that correlates with habeas outcomes than an actual
16 131 S Ct 1388 (2011).
17 See id at 1398 (holding that "review under § 2254(d)[] is limited to the record
that was before the state court that adjudicated the claim on the merits").
18 See, for example, Wilson u Mazzuca, 570 F3d 490 (2d Cir 2009); PecoraroV Walls,
286 F3d 439 (7th Cir 2002); Valdez u Cockrell, 274 F3d 941 (5th Cir 2001).
19 Pinholster,131 S Ct at 1400.
20 See, for example, Greene u Fisher, 132 S Ct 38, 44 (2011) (describing § 2254(d) as
a "relitigation bar"); Harrington u Richter, 131 S Ct 770, 785 (2011) (same); Premo V
Moore, 131 S Ct 733, 739 (2011) (specifying when § 2254(d) "permit[s] relitigation").
21 See Huq, 81 U Chi L Rev at 558, 581 (cited in note 2) (asserting that "theories
based on feedback loops provide no compelling normative warrant for the doctrinal
status quo").
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source of outcome causation. State criminal-justice administration
is tragically underresourced and error prone, but that state of
affairs is not particularly sensitive to recent or contemplated
changes in federal postconviction law.
I have two major disagreements with the fault-based account. First, the analogy to constitutional tort works only for the
§ 2254(d) inquiry. With respect to the other procedural inquires,
fault means something materially different. Characterizing
these inquires as fault-based requires an elastic definition of
fault that undermines Huq's explanatory objective. Second, Huq
has excluded several areas of habeas doctrine that rather decisively demonstrate a commitment to sorting cases based on innocence-a sorting principle he dismisses based on the data that
he did not exclude.
1. Fault in the remedial restrictions.
Because I do not believe that there are discrete tracks of
habeas process, I relate my thoughts by reference to the specific
procedural inquiries marking any potential path to federal relief. Huq argues that "postconviction jurisprudence has moved
into alignment" with constitutional tort law, by which he means
the qualified immunity doctrine that imposes a heightened culpability requirement on any government official sued for damages. 22 Habeas doctrine, Huq suggests, is beginning to exhibit
many features of other remedial jurisprudence.23 That Huq is
mining remedies for transsubstantive principles is itself a noteworthy academic development, but his pursuit of big-picture fit
suppresses some important differentiation as expressed through
the details.24
The argument that habeas jurisprudence exhibits remedial
transsubstantivity is most persuasive if limited to a claim about
how the § 2254(d) relitigation restriction works. Federal merits
review is available only if an inmate shows that the state court
Id at 581.
See id at 583-85.
24 Of course, virtually no positive social science model built around abstracted predictors can be useful "in the real world' without suppressing the detail necessary to
make the abstraction. Nothing about such abstraction is fatal to a predictive model. See
Milton Friedman, The Methodology of Positive Economics, in Milton Friedman, ed, Essays in Positive Economics 3, 40-41 (Chicago 1962). One predictive model might nonetheless be preferable to another because, for instance, it either has equal predictive power
with less detail suppression or has more predictive power and equivalent detail suppression. See id at 10.
22
23
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is "at fault" because it unreasonably processed the data before it,
with "data" consisting of both law and facts. A state court is at
fault when it unreasonably bumbles a decision just like a lawenforcement officer is liable when he or she violates clearly established law.25
If fault is defined that way, then there is indeed some transsubstantive convergence around the fault delta that Huq specifies. First, the Roberts Court has substantially increased the
showing of error that an inmate must make in order to qualify a
state decision as unreasonable under § 2254(d). Roberts Court
opinions regularly imply that a state outcome is not unreasonable unless every "fairminded jurist" would reject it,26 but the
Rehnquist Court expressly rejected a functionally equivalent
standard when presented with the question in Terry Williams v
Taylor.27 Second, in Pinholster, the Roberts Court limited the
assessment of legal reasonability to the record before the state
court. 2 8 By limiting the § 2254(d) inquiry to the state court record, the Roberts Court opted for a fault-identifying rule rather
than an error-identifying one.
Huq's model has some trouble when it moves beyond
§ 2254(d) to other restrictions on the habeas remedy. Fault
means something a little different for the other restrictions, and
those distinctions have two important implications. First, the
other definitions of fault undermine a theory of transsubstantive
convergence. Second, by using fault as a catchall term for all
forms of error, culpability, and diligence that determine habeas
outcomes, Huq defines it so abstractly that it ceases to effectively map events onto outcomes.
Specifically, Huq uses fault in at least four senses: (1) the
wrongfulness of the underlying constitutional violation during
the state criminal proceeding, (2) state culpability exhibited
while litigating the violation, (3) state culpability as expressed
through a manifest judicial error in adjudicating the claim, and
(4) a lapse in inmate diligence in litigating the claim.29 Constitutional-tort law and habeas doctrine converge somewhat with respect to the fault embedded in the § 2254(d) rules-the third
25 There are already problems in equating constitutional violations of state law enforcement with the adjudication of those in a court, but I set those aside in the interest of
space.
26 See, for example, Richter, 131 S Ct at 786.
27 529 US 362, 376-77 (2000).
28 See Pinholster, 131 S Ct at 1398.
29 See Huq, 81 U Chi L Rev at 583-84 (cited in note 2).
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sense enumerated above-but not with respect to the other fault
categories. Moreover, the breadth of the term undermines the
degree to which it is capable of contributing to a precise model.
To phrase the point a little more formally, an independent variable cannot usefully predict outcomes when that variable is defined in a way that makes assigning a value to it difficult.
2. Sorting for innocence.
Huq also excludes from his data many decisions that undermine the proposition that the emerging habeas regime is insensitive to innocence. Specifically, he excludes evidence of a developing,
transdoctrinal innocence focus appearing in procedural-default,
statute-of-limitations, and successive-petition inquiries. If an
assessment of the Roberts Court includes these developments,
then the picture changes substantially.
First, Huq excludes miscarriage-of-justice cases from the
procedural-default jurisprudence. A miscarriage-of-justice showing-usually threshold proof of actual innocence-excuses the
forfeiture in state proceedings.30 He omits those cases because
the excuse has a low success rate,31 but all habeas arguments
have a low success rate. In any event, the exclusion of the cases
seems odd because Huq's professed point of emphasis is what
the Supreme Court is deciding rather than what lower courts are
doing.32 Whatever the ground-level success rate, the Roberts
Court has decisively (unanimously) preserved the miscarriageof-justice excuse in the face of arguments that the Antiterrorism
and Effective Death Penalty Act33 (AEDPA) abolished it.34 As
Huq acknowledges in a footnote, the miscarriage-of-justice excuse plays a pivotal role in facilitating merits review in DNA exoneration cases. 35
Second, Huq excludes § 2244(d) limitations cases because they
"represent[ ] less an emanation of some deeply felt judicial principle than the Court's necessary scrimmaging with a poorly drafted
rule encountering a heterogeneous set of external circumstances."36

30
31
32

33
34
35

justice
36
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That observation may be true, but it should not be disqualifying.
That courts must construct legal meaning out of encounters between a poorly crafted statute and varied fact patterns is a norm
of habeas law, not an exception. For example, Huq's abovequoted language describes § 2254(d) just as well as it describes
the limitations provision. The excluded Roberts-era cases are
important because they express an unmistakable commitment
to innocence-related exceptions. After creating an equitabletolling exception to excuse otherwise untimely claims,37 the
Court clarified that sufficiently strong evidence of innocence
would trigger that unwritten safety valve.38
Third, Huq fails to consider the innocence exceptions to restrictions on successive petitions. In In re Davis,39 the Supreme
Court reviewed an order denying authorization for successive
habeas proceedings notwithstanding a statutory provision that
expressly forbids certiorari consideration.40 The Supreme Court
reviewed the actual innocence claim pursuant to its obscure
power to issue original habeas writs and found the innocence
evidence sufficient to justify an order transferring the case to a
district court for factfinding.41 Moreover, that order shortcircuited other habeas law in fairly breathtaking ways. It did
not require that the district court apply § 2254(d), nor that it
find any constitutional violation at all. The transfer simply directed the district court to evaluate innocence.
In isolation, each case thread might be subject to disqualifying caveats. Taken together, however, these cases plainly express a commitment to innocence as an organizing doctrinal
principle on the Roberts Court. Fault is part of the story, but
any model that marginalizes innocence as a sorting priority is
incomplete.
II. AN ALTERNATE MODEL
In the balance of this response, I provide an alternative
account of the Roberts Court's habeas jurisprudence. Like Professor Huq, I believe that the jurisprudence expresses a discernable paradigm of federal habeas process; the two of us differ only
on the particulars. The Court is constructing what I call a

38

See Holland, 560 US at 645.
See McQuiggin u Perkins, 133 S Ct 1924, 1931 (2013).

39

557 US 952 (2009).

40

Id at 952.
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37

41
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"merits-opportunity" regime, which ensures that a diligent state
inmate gets at least one shot at a merits adjudication in a jurisdictionally competent court. The merits-opportunity regime differs from earlier models of habeas reform in that it focuses only
on the availability of merits disposition, and not on whether the
state afforded process that tends to produce accurate outcomes.
Virtually every rule and proposed reform for federal postconviction review bears the imprint of a 1963 Harvard Law Review article by Professor Paul M. Bator, Finality in Criminal
Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners.42 Bator
proceeded from the epistemic proposition that absolute legal
truth was unknowable. He reasoned that federal courts should
treat decisions as final when state "processes previously employed for determination of questions of fact and law were fairly
and rationally adapted to that task."43 He believed that institutions ensure accuracy by proxy of reliable procedure and urged
that a state merits disposition precludes subsequent federal review as long as the inmate received "full and fair" state process
on the claim.44 Bator thought that the full-and-fair model accurately described the history of state-inmate process and that it
produced desirable outcomes. 45
Rules of Batorian provenance emphasize a finality interest
triggered by reliable state-claim processing. The archetypal federal claim in Bator's day, however, bears no resemblance to the
mine-run claim subject to modern habeas process. That change
has prompted federal judges and legislators-once largely committed to a round of federal habeas process for all diligently asserted claims-to pursue objectives even more modest than
those urged by Bator. Modern habeas paradigms must account
for the gradual-but-unmistakable convergence of two phenomena:
(1) an exploding set of potential claims, and (2) more complicated
claim-forfeiture scenarios. The Roberts Court has responded with
42 See generally Paul M. Bator, Finalityin Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners, 76 Harv L Rev 441 (1963). Many late twentieth-century legislative proposals derived from Bator's model. See, for example, Lee Kovarsky, AEDPAs
Wrecks: Comity, Finality, and Federalism, 82 Tulane L Rev 443, 460-62, 502-07 (2007).
The Supreme Court regularly cites Bator's idea to support the promotion of a finality
interest. See, for example, Calderon u Thompson, 523 US 538, 555 (1998); McCleskey V
Zant, 499 US 467, 492 (199 1); Teague u Lane, 489 US 288, 309 (1989).
43 Bator, 76 Harv L Rev at 455 (cited in note 42).
44 Id at 456.
45 See id at 451-53, 463-65. Huq correctly questions several basic justifications for
Bator's model, including the notion that plenary review in federal court would "demoralize" state judges. See Huq, 81 U Chi L Rev at 572-73 (cited in note 2).
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a principle that diligent prisoners should get a merits disposition, but it has not committed to the full-and-fair process principles that are hallmarks of Batorian models.
A. The Decline of the Batorian Archetype
Bator's model embodies the principle that a diligent inmate
should have at least one full-and-fair opportunity to litigate a
constitutional challenge before a jurisdictionally competent
court. 4 6 Whether the court was state or federal did not matter.
The idea was that, in a world in which absolute truth is unknowable, reliable process produces outcomes that ought not to
be relitigated in a federal habeas forum. When state courts had
supplied such process, Bator believed that federal habeas review
added no meaningful increment of confidence in an outcome.
The full-and-fair model was too restrictive to ever secure a
legislative majority-even as part of the Republican-crafted
AEDPA, the habeas law passed in the immediate wake of the
Oklahoma City bombing.47 Notwithstanding legislative setbacks,
however, those favoring severe federal habeas restrictions have
scored a series of decisive post-AEDPA Supreme Court victories.
Not only has the Court endorsed a maximally broad view of
what qualifies as a state merits disposition, but it also permits
state merits dispositions to preclude federal relitigation notwithstanding many questions about whether underlying state
procedure was full or fair.48
A changed paradigm of habeas process was almost inevitable given the changed attributes of the typical state-inmate litigation. Bator's was the dominant model of federal habeas process because of how elegantly it prescribed outcomes for the
mine-run litigant. Bator's archetype was a state inmate who
used federal habeas relief as a vehicle to lodge a constitutional
challenge that was litigated at trial, such as a coerced-confession
claim.49 Such serial consideration invited the question whether a

46 By "jurisdictionally competent," I simply mean a court capable of exercising personal jurisdiction over the respondent-custodian and subject-matter jurisdiction over the
pertinent federal questions (the claims).
47 See Benjamin R. Oyre III, The Failure of Words: Habeas Corpus Reform, the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, and When a Judgment of Conviction Becomes Final for the Purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 2255(1), 44 Wm & Mary L Rev 441, 452-53
(2002).
48 See Parts I.A.4, II.B.
49 See Bator, 76 Harv L Rev at 526-27 (cited in note 42).
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federal forum should afford additional process to decide a claim
that the state might have decided quite reliably.
This inmate archetype-an effectively represented one, capable of lodging the claim at trial-is modern fiction wearing a
jumpsuit and bracelets. At least two important things have
changed since Bator launched his broadside against the Warren
Court's habeas jurisprudence. First, the number of cognizable
constitutional claims has exploded, and many of them are incapable of trial adjudication. Second, Bator wrote at a time when
state postconviction (collateral) review was in its infancy, so the
conditions of nonmerits adjudication were quite different. Both
developments have put enormous institutional pressure on Congress and the Supreme Court to figure out new ways to husband
limited federal habeas resources.
Bator published Finality in Criminal Law in January 1963,
before the Supreme Court undertook most of what is now described as the "revolution" in modern criminal procedure.so
There was no Brady v Maryland,51 which now requires the
prosecution to disclose exculpatory evidence.52 There were no decisions incorporating Sixth Amendment compulsory process, 53
jury trial,54 speedy trial,5 and Confrontation Clause rights.56 The
Supreme Court had yet to guarantee legal representation to indigent defendants under Gideon v Wainwright57 and was two
decades away from specifying how the right to a lawyer required
effective assistance of counsel.58 The volume and the content of
claims have changed in ways that date Bator's archetype. The
principle that every claim should get a full-and-fair hearing was
an easier legal commitment before the criminal-procedure revolution than it is now. Moreover, the coerced-confession heuristic
is misleading because the vast majority of modern claims involve
information outside the record presented to a state court for consideration-because, for example, the prosecution suppressed

50 Corinna Barrett Lain, Countermajoritarian
Hero or Zero? Rethinking the Warren
Court'sRole in the CriminalProcedureRevolution, 152 U Pa L Rev 1361, 1389 (2004).
51 373 US 83 (1963).
52 Id at 87, 90-91.
53 See Washington v Texas, 388 US 14, 19 (1967).
54 See Duncan v Louisiana,391 US 145, 149-50 (1968).
5s See Klopfer v North Carolina,386 US 213, 225-26 (1967).
56 See Pointer v Texas, 380 US 400, 407-08 (1965).
57 372 US 335, 340 (1963).
58 See Strickland v Washington, 466 US 668, 684-86 (1984).
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evidence (Brady)59 or the defendant's lawyer was constitutionally
ineffective (Strickland v Washington).60 Whether the discussion
is about a habeas paradigm's descriptive accuracy or its normative justification, it cannot proceed persuasively by assuming
aberrant claim content.
Nor should the favored paradigm assume that claim content
is usually decided on the merits. The full-and-fair ideal flourished
at a time when a state inmate was, in fact, far more likely to receive a state merits disposition after considerable process. Modern state deliberation, however, usually entails only cursory
procedure. Because so many claims involve content outside the
trial record and must therefore be exhausted collaterally,61 state
inmates find themselves in increasing contact with state postconviction process, a toxic swamp of byzantine procedure and
under-resourced indigent representation. For claims that states
must consider collaterally, there is no federal right-statutory or
constitutional-to a lawyer, let alone a competent one. 62 Pro se
inmates end up forfeiting claims in the teeth of obscure state
postconviction rules that confound even experienced lawyers.
And even when state collateral process culminates in a merits
determination, that determination is frequently based on a record constructed under precisely the same constraints that

See Brady, 373 US at 84.
466 US 668 (1984). The leading empirical work on habeas litigation in district
courts found that ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims were raised in 81 percent of
capital cases and 50.4 percent of noncapital cases and that Brady (or related) claims
were raised in 43.1 percent of capital cases and 13 percent of noncapital cases. Nancy J.
King, Fred L. Cheesman II, and Brian J. Ostrom, Final Technical Report: Habeas Litigation in US District Courts: An Empirical Study of Cases Filed by State Prisonersunder
the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 *28, 30 (2007), online at
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/219559.pdf (visited Nov 12, 2014).
61 See Eve Brensike Primus, Effective Trial Counsel after Martinez v Ryan: Focusing on the Adequacy of State Procedures, 122 Yale L J 2604, 2609 (2013).
62 See Kovarsky, 82 Tulane L Rev at 466 (cited in note 42) (noting that "[t]here is
no federal requirement that offenders have effective counsel during any state collateral
review'). There are some state laws requiring that some inmate categories be represented. These laws almost always involve capitally sentenced inmates. See, for example,
Overview of Capital Punishment Laws, Washington Courts (2014), online at
http://www.courts.wa.gov/newsinfo/index.cfmfa=newsinfo.displayContent&theFile=cont
ent/deathPenalty/overview (visited Nov 14, 2014) (noting that, beginning in 1997, "the
Washington State Supreme Court began requiring the appointment of defense co-counsel
for death penalty cases at trial and on appeal, consistent with American Bar Association
and federal law guidelines"). See also Eric M. Freedman, Giarranto is a Scarecrow: The
Right to Counsel in State Capital Postconviction Proceedings, 91 Cornell L Rev 1079,
1086 n 45 (2006) (collecting statutes).
59

60
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cause mass forfeiture.63 In much the same way that differences
in claim content have forced changes in habeas law, so too have
differences in the way that content is processed in state collateral proceedings.
B. The Merits-Opportunity Regime
In a world of finite federal habeas resources, the on-theground reality of criminal-justice administration is grim. Mass
incarceration follows from the "war on drugs," constitutional error infects trials because state governments are as resourcestrapped as their federal counterpart, and inmates are generally
unrepresented when they seek state remedies.64 Huq and I both
read the Roberts Court's habeas jurisprudence as an attempt to
separate wheat from chaff in this decaying ecosystem, but we
read it in different ways.
Huq overemphasizes the role of fault in how habeas law
processes claims; the primary sorting mechanism is not based
around the presence or absence of fault but instead reflects
whether there is a state merits decision. As a concluding proposition, I want to show that the Roberts Court is developing an
on-the-merits paradigm, which involves: (1) committing to a
principle that diligent prisoners should have one merits disposition of a claim, and (2) abandoning the principle that the state
process producing that merits disposition be full and fair.
Under Bator-influenced models, full-and-fair state merits
adjudication precludes federal relitigation. The Roberts Court
treats state merits dispositions differently in two ways, with the
first effect dominating the second and with the result being that
a state merits disposition enjoys greater preclusive scope than
what a full-and-fair model would require.
First, under the Roberts Court's jurisprudence, a state decision triggers the federal preclusion provision if it is on the merits,
notwithstanding any failure of the full-and-fair condition.65 There
are situations in which a procedural defect in the state proceeding
might allow an inmate to avoid the preclusion bar, but such

63 See, for example, Martinez u Ryan, 132 S Ct 1309, 1317 (2012) (noting that,
"[w]hile confined to prison, the prisoner is in no position to develop the evidentiary basis
for a claim of ineffective assistance, which often turns on evidence outside the trial record").
64 See Huq, 81 U Chi L Rev at 588-90 (cited in note 2) (discussing the problems associated with mass incarceration in the American criminal-justice system that has persisted since the 1970s).
65 See id at 536-37.
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exceptions are limited to failures of state process that themselves rise to the level of constitutional-due-process violations.66
Second, courtesy of the Roberts Court, the existence of a
state merits determination makes federal review almost impossible to obtain. The text of the statute does not lead inexorably
to that conclusion, permitting federal merits consideration when
the state decision was contrary to clearly established law, unreasonably applied clearly established law, or based on an unreasonable determination of fact.67 The Roberts Court, however,
has constructed the § 2254(d) restriction in a way that is impossible for all but the most aggrieved petitioner to avoid. Under
Pinholster, a state inmate cannot go beyond the state record to
show that any of the criteria are satisfied.68 Moreover, in a series
of recent decisions, the Roberts Court has resuscitated a nofairminded-jurist standard for reasonableness
that the
Rehnquist Court rejected in Terry Williams.69 And, under Harrington v Richter,70 an unreasoned (summary) state order precludes federal relitigation if any hypothetical rationale might be
reasonable within the meaning of § 2254(d)(1).71
The foregoing scenarios involve federal habeas treatment of
claims subject to a state merits disposition, but the Roberts
Court has also developed new rules for dealing with claims that
states denied on nonmerits grounds. Huq provides a more detailed account of the developments,72 but I'll provide a skeletal
discussion here. For years, inadequate state postconviction representation could not excuse a default. More specifically, under
Coleman v Thompson,73 state postconviction lawyering could
never constitute cause under the cause-and-prejudice showing
necessary to establish the excuse. 74
Coleman was particularly harsh when the underlying challenge was an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel ("IAC") claim.75
66 See, for example, Panetti u Quarterman,551 US 930, 953 (2007) (holding that an
inmate avoided § 2254(d) by showing an "antecedent" due-process violation).
67 See 28 USC § 2254(d).
68 See Part I.A.4.
69 See Huq, 81 U Chi L Rev at 538-39 (cited in note 2).
70
131 S Ct 770 (2011).
71 Id at 786.
72 See Huq, 81 U Chi L Rev at 545-48 (cited in note 2).
73 501 US 722 (1991).
74 Id at 752-54.
75 Although Coleman formally reserved a ruling on the IAC scenario, that reservation was almost entirely ignored by lower courts. See Primus, 122 Yale L J at 2612 (cited
in note 61).
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IAC claims are almost universally lodged on collateral review,
when the inmate can develop an appropriate record.76 The problem is that state inmates have no federal right to state postconviction counsel and therefore lack any derivative entitlement to
an effective lawyer, so the underlying IAC claims were being defaulted constantly.77 Particularly troubling was that the claims
were being defaulted without any lapse in inmate diligence-the
inmate had simply sustained the double whammy of having had
inadequate trial and state postconviction assistance.
In 2012, the Supreme Court decided Martinez v Ryan,78
holding that inadequate state postconviction representation
could in fact excuse an otherwise-forfeited IAC claim.79 The result is that-for the single most frequently asserted constitutional
violation-the Roberts Court established a device for diligent
inmates without a state merits disposition to obtain federal merits review. IAC claims, however, are not the only claims that
must be litigated collaterally. For example, claims that the
prosecution withheld exculpatory evidence or knowingly elicited
false testimony must be litigated under precisely the same conditions as IAC claims.80 As a result, the fit between my on-themerits model and the current reality of postconviction litigation
is imperfect-although justices have already identified the possibility that the Court might move in a direction that improves
it. Dissenting in Martinez, Justice Antonin Scalia (correctly) argued that nothing distinguished the rationale that the Court
used to permit merits review of the underlying IAC claim from a
rationale that it would use to permit merits review of any other
claim that must necessarily be litigated collaterally.81 Despite
the imperfections in the model, I nonetheless prefer it to Huq's
because, in my estimation, it generates better predictions with
abstractions that suppress less variation.82

76 See Megan Raker, Comment, State Prisoners with Federal Claims in Federal
Court: When Can a State Prisoner Overcome Procedural Default?, 73 Md L Rev 1173,
1178 (2014).
77 See Kovarsky, 82 Tulane L Rev at 466 (cited in note 42); Primus, 122 Yale L J at
2609-10 (cited in note 61).
78
132 S Ct 1309 (2012).
79 Id at 1315.
80 See Raker, Comment, 73 Md L Rev at 1178 (cited in note 76). See also Eric M.
Freedman, Enforcing the ABA Guidelines in Capital State Post-conviction Proceedings
after Martinez and Pinholster, 41 Hofstra L Rev 591, 596 (2014).
81 See Martinez, 132 S Ct at 1321 (Scalia dissenting).
82 See note 24.
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Although my model involves fault, it has nothing to do with
the fault of the state; it involves the fault of the inmate. A state
inmate is permitted to obtain merits review of an otherwise forfeited claim if there was no lapse in diligence, and the culpability
of the state does not matter. Indeed, even the doctrinal positioning of Martinez-permitting inadequate state postconviction
representation to constitute cause 83-emphasizes that the excuse is based on a forfeiture caused by something external to the
inmate. If state fault really had anything to do with it, then the
first substantive claim subject to a modified Coleman rule would
not be an IAC challenge, but rather a Brady violation. Whereas
IAC challenges involve deficient performance by court-appointed
lawyers, Brady violations involve active suppression by the
State.
Huq plots modern habeas jurisprudence along two paths,
with fault sorting inmates both between and within each track.
Modern jurisprudence is better conceptualized as a single track,
with each stop on that track representing a different remedial
restriction. As expressed through several of these restrictions,
one unmistakable principle emerging from the decisional law is
the importance of ensuring that a diligent inmate have an opportunity to at least one on-the-merits adjudication, whether it
be in state or federal court.
CONCLUSION

I describe Professor Huq as "The Habeas Optimist" for two
distinct reasons. First, as a descriptive matter, Huq sees in the
Roberts Court's habeas jurisprudence decisional patterns that
meaningfully map facts onto outcomes. Second, as a normative
matter, he sounds a not-completely-dispirited note, suggesting
that habeas activity on the Roberts Court might be desirable insofar as it brings attention to the pathetic condition of indigent
representation, amplifies death penalty discourse, and catalyzes
political responses through the very act of review.84 Although I
share Huq's skeptical view of legislative-reform proposals, I still
fall into the category of people for whom his normative position

83
84

Martinez, 132 S Ct at 1315 (majority).
See Huq, 81 U Chi L Rev at 601-04 (cited in note 2).
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is "the squeezing of sour lemonade from withered lemons."85 I
comment on that position only briefly and in conclusion.
Whatever the symbolic value of the Supreme Court's contemporary habeas decisions, the regime will never make sense
ethically or economically until the Court acknowledges and addresses certain basic realities. Whether an inmate obtains merits
review is hugely sensitive to differences in postconviction representation and barely sensitive at all to the quality of the underlying claim. The habeas jurisprudence soft pedals some of the
most obvious pathologies of state law enforcement and criminaljustice administration, favoring instead a wishful parity principle
that state and federal governments tend to administer federal
law with equal zeal. Whether the Roberts Court is developing
habeas jurisprudence in one track or two, the doctrine is still a
train wreck.

85
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